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_I sent a report with this bug some time ago to the email address firstname.lastname@example.org and I got bounty for it but it still has not been fixed so I put the issue._
**Describe the bug**
The content and url of issue invitations are generated on the API side instead of the server, which allows for misuse of the mailing system and deliberate misleading of users for the purpose of attack.
Due to the fact that e-mails contain the official format / pattern and are sent from the **email@example.com** email you can create a very reliable phising.
I have sent a crafted invitation to the user @ririen (me) if someone needs POC, please give me nicks.
1. Go to any issue and click button share.
2. Select the user you want to send the invitation to (you can choose yourself).
3. Before you click “Send Invite” enable proxy / capture requests, for example using the Burp Suite.
4. In the captured request, change the parameters:
- **msg** - the content of the e-mail
- **invite_url** - the address of the url which leads by clicking the “View Bounty” button in an email.
5. Send the changed request.
The user sees a credible invitation from another Gitcoin user. However, he has no idea that clicking the View Bounty button redirects him to the phishing page. If he is careless and will click / execute actions on the fake website, the attacker who sent him an invitation may take over his account or threaten the security.
The content of the message and url should not be so easy to change and should be downloaded from the server. Otherwise, when there is a possibility to change a specific invitation sent by email, there are opportunities for abuse.
It is best not to give users the opportunity to change the link and content of invitations and fetch them on the non-browser server side :)